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change at the IMF  
 
Cornel Ban 
 
Abstract 
 
Soon after the Lehman crisis, the International Monetary Fund surprised its critics 
with a reconsideration of its research and advice on fiscal policy. The paper traces 
the influence that the Fund’s senior management and research elite has had on 
the recalibration of the IMF’s doctrine on fiscal policy. The findings suggest and 
shows that overall there has been some selective incorporation of unorthodox 
ideas in the Fund’s fiscal doctrine, while the strong thesis that austerity has 
expansionary effects has been rejected. Indeed, the Fund’s new orthodoxy is 
concerned with the recessionary effects of fiscal consolidation and, more recently, 
endorses calls for a more progressive adjustment of the costs of fiscal 
sustainability. These changes notwithstanding, the IMF’s adaptive incremental 
transformation on fiscal policy issues falls short of a paradigm shift and is best 
conceived of as an important recalibration of the pre-crisis status quo.and 
rejection of some elements of orthodoxy that this paper uncovers have been 
limited.  
 
Keywords: IMF, staff research, Keynesian, New Consensus macroeconomics, 
austerity 
  
 
 
From great expectations to modest recalibrations 
 
In 2008, many expected that the widespread outrage and economic hardship 
caused by the financial crisis would lead to the replacement of the neoliberal 
policy paradigm.  
The rediscovery of Keynesian macroeconomics in 2008-2009 by the leaders of the 
G20 seemed to indicate that change was imminent. Indeed, mainstream 
macroeconomic and finance economics seemed on their way to a historical trial. 
For a while, decades of debates over the details of the best version of the 
efficient market hypothesis and the most refined dynamic general stochastic 
equilibrium models seemed out of place.   
 
In the U.S., mythical figures of mainstream macroeconomists were dragged in 
front of the Congress to explain themselves, their apathy for lawmakers’ concerns 
about unemployment exposed in full view.1 Allan Greenspan, the former 
chairman of the Fed and the guru of neoliberal practice offered a few public 
admissions of contrition over his beliefs. Financial Times editors called for the 
nationalization of large financial institutions and their transformation in public 
utilities. In Paris, Nicholas Sarkozy, a conservative president who campaigned on 
a neoliberal ticket the year before, allowed himself to be photographed leafing 
through a copy of Das Kapital. The world, it seemed, was ripe for a new economic 
model based on anything but more of the same neoliberal theory. If reality was of 
any empirical use, the case against mainstream economics was clear: 
[g]overning neoliberal ideas pretty much denied such a crisis could ever happen. So when 
it happened it was bound to open up some room for ideas that said such events were 
bound to happen if you left markets alone to regulate themselves, which is exactly the 
Keynesian point. Given this, it was hard to defend publicly the logic of self-correcting 
markets at a time when they were so obviously not self-correcting […] Furthermore, as 
well as denying it could happen, neoclassical policy was entirely focused upon avoiding                                                         
1 When asked why mainstream macroeconomic models have little to say about real-world 
unemployment, V.V. Chari, a luminary of modern macroeconomics said that “providing 
unemployment benefits does tend to discourage people from looking as intensively for jobs (…) it 
tends to make them more unwilling to accept jobs when they do come up.” U.S. House of 
Representatives “Building a Science of Economics for the Real World” Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight” serial no 111-106, Washington, July 20, 2010, p. 
51. 
 
one problem, inflation, and providing one outcome, stable prices. As a result it seemed to 
have very little to say about a world where deflation was now the worry and price 
stabilization meant raising, not lowering, inflation expectations (Blyth 2013). 
But by late 2009, it turned out that the proponents of neoliberal theory had much 
to say and that they would go a long way to defend the theory’s core. As a result, 
instead of drastic change, the following years brought a mere recalibration of 
neoliberal theory, testimony to its adaptability in the face of countervailing 
political and economic dynamics.  
 
Scholars have showed that international economic organizations such as the IMF 
have been instrumental in crafting and disseminating neoliberalism.  
This paper continues this research agenda through an analysis of the “austerity 
debate” inside this established “lab” of applied orthodox macroeconomics. It 
departs from the observation that the IMF’s reaction to the Great Recession has 
been to balance adherence to orthodoxy and the attempt to make fiscal 
neoliberalism more flexible. While the IMF’s shifting views on fiscal policy have 
baffled its critics, the depth, significance and causes of the shift remain 
unexplored. This paper addresses this gap by asking how deep the change has 
been and how has the Fund’s research elite contributed to it. It suggests that the 
contribution of staff research to doctrinal change has been important but that far 
from being a Damascene road towards a new economic paradigm, so far this 
interregnum has spawned a fiscal policy hybrid that does not represent a 
dramatic departure from the core of neoliberal fiscal policy thinking. 
What is fiscal neoliberalism? 
 
This paper defines fiscal neoliberalism as a set of economic theories . Within 
these theories, ideas about fiscal policy play a prominent role because they speak 
to essential problems of distribution in society. Whether they are organized 
under the aegis of New Classical Macroeconomics, New Keynesian Economic or 
the synthesis of the two, in the so-called “New Neoclassical Synthesis,” neoliberal 
ideas on fiscal policy are tied together by skepticism about the expansionary 
effects of government spending and a penchant for spending cuts and regressive 
tax increases as a preferred fiscal adjustment strategy. 
This reading of neoliberalism resists the tendency to see it as an “essentialized, 
singular model with planetary uniformity” (Peck and Theodore 2012: 184), a 
revamped version of the universalistic aspirations of liberal political economy and 
neoclassical economics, or even as market fundamentalism (Stiglitz 2008; Somers 
and Block 2014). These popular characterizations have made it harder to grasp 
the ways in which actually existing neoliberalism has been both pro-market and 
pro-state.  
Both supporters and critics of austerity agree that the macroeconomics of 
neoliberalism has a considerable Keynesian layer (Arestis 2013); Woodford 2009) 
and even the IMF now sees Nordic-style labor unions and neo-corporatism as an 
enablers of fiscal rectitude (Blanchard et al 2013). One often forgets that the 
Washington Consensus was all about markets and fiscal rigor, but it also stressed 
that healthcare and education should be publicly provided (Williamson 1991). 
Anti-market ideas and policies prop up the housing sector in the UK (Hay 2011) 
and the US acts as a developmental state when it comes to using government 
resources to spur industrial innovation (Mazzucato 2013). Since 2008, both sides 
of the Atlantic nationalized large swathes of their financial sector and effectively 
guarantee the balance sheets of too big to fail (in the US) and too big to bail 
institutions (in the EU)(Blyth 2013).  
I propose a definition of neoliberalism that factors in both market-society 
relations as well as the distribution relations within society. To this end, I see 
nNeoliberalism ideas aimed do not at aim to destroying the state, but at 
transforming but to repurpose it. When put together, they  to remove social 
constraints on market freedoms,  and support the operation of the market and 
while mobilize ing state power to redistribute freedoms and privilege towards the 
top of the social pyramid. In the “big tent” represented by neoliberalism, 
economic ideas about fiscal policy are central because they define what is 
scientifically legitimate in terms of how the state should distribute resources. It is 
to this specific niche of the neoliberal ideational universe that this chapter speaks 
to. Freedom to choose and spend at the top lives next to workfare and the penal 
state at the bottom. Just like Polanyi’s laissez faire, neoliberalism was planned and 
is being propped up by the state.  
The Reform of Neoliberal Macroeconomics 
 
Until 2008 the International Monetary Fund upheld the so-called “Treasury view,” 
according to which expansionary fiscal policy is generally a misguided attempt to 
stimulate an economy in recession. Instead, it is austerity that should be pursued 
(Krueger 1998; Mussa and Sevastano 1999; Ghosh 2005; Gabor 2010). But three 
days before the tumultuous year 2008 came to a close, the IMF surprised its 
critics by endorsing the use of fiscal stimulus as a way to overcome the greatest 
crisis that capitalism had known since the Great Depression. Two years later, 
when European policymakers stated that austerity was not just necessary to lower 
debt but could even lead to growth, the IMF begged to differ. As one critic of the 
IMF put it, this revisionism was part of an “interregnum pregnant with 
development opportunities” (Grabel 2011). 
Specifically, in addition to allowing the stimulus option (for some) and 
discrediting the argument that austerity leads to growth, the Fund’s research and 
general policy advice suggested that where fiscal consolidation is “inevitable,” it 
should be introduced only gradually and by recalibrating its instruments so as to 
strengthen state investments and improve the economic status of those at the 
very bottom of the income distribution.  
At the same time, rather than place mass unemployment as the main challenge of 
fiscal policy, the IMF’s has not displaced financial market credibility through debt 
sustainability as the main goal of fiscal policy. By subordinating fiscal policy to 
the vote of financial markets, the Fund leaves the stimulus option open only to a 
dozen or so countries at any given time during the crisis. Moreover, ever for 
those cases, the Fund suggests that “entitlement reform” (cuts to social security 
and other programs) is a way of maintaining long-run credibility with the bond 
markets.  
Given the intellectual path-dependency of credibility as the main goal of fiscal 
policy, it is not surprising that the staff either obscured or closed more heterodox 
paths to reducing debt and to creating fiscal space for stimulus. Moreover, its 
support for more redistributive taxation and spending options has been 
hamstrung by neoliberal skepticism towards universal social benefits and the 
value of sharply progressive taxation. This adaptive change appears a lot more 
modest than the transformative yet non-paradigmatic change uncovered by 
some scholars in the Fund’s recent capital account policy (Grabel 2011; Gallagher 
11; Gallagher et al 2012; Chwieroth 2013). 
Nevertheless, even an adaptive shift needs to be explained.  To do so, the paper 
shows that beginning with 2008, the IMF’s epistemic community experienced a 
rapid and important change in personnel that brought to the fore ideational 
entrepreneurs who built a revisionist network inside the Fund. To this end, they 
took advantage of the widening rift in academic macroeconomics between fiscal 
policy pessimists and optimists. To prevail in a professional environment 
constrained by orthodox thinking, these IMF economists refrained from battling 
the main goal of fiscal policy and framed their arguments in the lexicon of 
mainstream methods and models. In so doing, they won the debate inside the 
Fund at the cost of putting the brakes on a more systematic reconsideration of 
fiscal policy for hard times.  
Theoretical framework 
 
Political economists have begun to examine the internal sources of change in 
IMF’s economic ideas and policies. In a constructivist vein, they argued that IMF 
staff’s experience of a crisis is shaped by their interpretations of its causes and 
remedies (Mommani 2005; Chwieroth 2009; 2013; Park and Vetterlein 2010; 
Moschella 2011; 2012; 2013; Clift and Tomilison 2012; Broome and Seabrooke 
2012; Lutz and Kranke 2013; Grabel 2013). The paper contributes to this 
emerging scholarship by drawing on the insights of three bodies of scholarship 
that had not been connected before: constructivist studies of international 
organizations, the sociology of the economic profession and the sociology of 
science.  
Constructivists argue that international economic institutions derive legitimacy 
from their exercise of epistemic authority over economic policy (Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004; Chwieroth 2009; 2013; Broome and Seabrooke 2009; Weaver 
2009; Seabrooke 2012). This legitimacy can be threatened by crises that challenge 
economic orthodoxy. Most of the time, however, such situations trigger changes 
that are less than paradigmatic shifts, with incrementally adaptive and 
transformative change emerging as the most likely outcomes (Chwieroth 2009; 
2013). Change, then, takes place at the level of policy instruments and settings, 
while policy goals survive.  
Paradigmatic change occurs only when the goals of policy shift (Hall 1991). In the 
context of this paper, the change from an orthodox to a heterodox (e.g. 
Keynesian) policy paradigm would entail a shift from the goal of fiscal 
sustainability through deficit cuts to full employment and the closing of the 
difference between actual and potential GDP via spending increases, sharply 
progressive taxation and financial repression. In contrast, policy change is of a 
lesser order if only policy instruments and policy settings change. If the Fund’s 
growth theory is reliance on public investments and income transfers more than 
they on tax cuts, the Fund engages in a change of instruments rather than goals. 
At the level of the settings of policy, if IMF economists plead for “backloading” 
(gradual introduction of) austerity, this does not show that the Fund has gone 
through a Keynesian paradigm shift, only that this sequencing is more likely to 
balance growth with debt sustainability.  
Within this non-paradigmatic spectrum, changes are transformative if the new 
instruments and settings are derived predominantly from heterodox schools of 
thought and result in an incremental challenge to the main policy goals (the case 
of the Fund’s endorsement of capital controls under certain conditions). In 
contrast, they are adaptive if they are drawn from a mixed bag of orthodox and 
heterodox theories and their cumulative effect is the reproduction of the 
orthodox policy goal. 
To pursue this route, the paper maps out the revisions made by IMF researchers 
to the traditional content of fiscal policy. Then, to establish the extent to which 
staff research had an impact in the general policy advice of the Fund, the analysis 
turns to the general reports of two critical bureaucracies in the Fund: the 
departments of Research and Fiscal Affairs.  
What explains adaptive change on fiscal policy? Some argue that shifts in the 
dominant economic ideas of the economic profession at large are eventually and 
incrementally reflected in how the IMF thinks (Woods 2006; Chwieroth 2009; 
2013). This is because “the Fund recruits almost exclusively from the economics 
profession, which leaves it highly susceptible to developments within the 
academic community […] (Chwieroth 2010). In other words the Fund and the 
economic profession are what Seabrooke and Tsingou (2009) called “linked 
ecologies”. While there has been no scientific paradigm shift among academic 
economists before or during the crisis (Blyth 2013), the internal diversity that 
some critics of mainstream macroeconomics (Arestis 2012; Hein and 
Stockhammer 2012) have uncovered within it should be taken more seriously. 
Given the “linked ecology”, a widening rift during the crisis and the growing 
strength of the supporters of activist fiscal policy (fiscal optimists) could be an 
enabler of revisionism at the Fund.   
Growing fiscal optimism in academia was a great opportunity for change at the 
Fund, but somebody had to grab that opportunity for it to have and impact. The 
paper hypothesizes that the second mechanism of ideational change is insider 
entrepreneurship carried via three sub-mechanisms: administrative intervention, 
conceptual editing and methodological framing. While the first mechanism 
affects relations of power in the Fund’s research infrastructure, editing and 
framing are needed to “sell” the revisionist message as long the orthodox in the 
Fund are not completely displaced. 
The widening rift in mainstream macroeconomics 
Relaxing the boundaries of fiscal orthodoxy 
 
Contrary to conventional thinking, the crisis seems to have deepened the 
divisions between fiscal policy optimists and pessimists. When the Lehman crisis 
struck, mainstream macro was the intellectual universe of New Consensus 
Macroeconomics (NCM), a school of thought forged during the late 1990s from 
the convergence of New Classical economics and New Keynesianism (Mankiw, 
2006; Fontana 2009; Colander 2011; Arestis 2012). NCM was skeptical towards 
fiscal policy and somewhat optimistic towards monetary policy. Indeed, if there 
was any hope for counter-cyclical macroeconomic management in hard times, 
NCM economists limited its ambit to the policy action of the central banks. 
 
NCM argued that the rational expectations of economic agents beat the 
Keynesian effects of fiscal policy. When the government tries to stimulate the 
economy, households and firms expect tax increases in the future and therefore 
cut spending and investment (Ricardian equivalence). Some New Consensus 
economists like Alberto Alesina at Harvard and Roberto Perotti at Bocconi 
University argued that because of this, both deficit spending and tax cuts will 
have low multipliers (i.e. output changes less than in proportion to the fiscal 
shock). Therefore, some argued that in order to improve expectations and kick-
start growth, the government should frontload fiscal consolidation measures 
(expansionary austerity).2 The New Keynesian faction inside NCM further 
consolidated this fiscal policy pessimism when they factored in Keynesian 
rigidities such as unionized wage bargaining. In the case of developing countries 
this fiscal policy skepticism was supplemented with remarks about their narrow 
automatic stabilizers and constrained access to capital markets (Hemming et al 
2002). 
From outside the mainstream, Neo-Keynesians and Post-Keynesians critiqued the 
fiscal policy pessimism of NCM by showing that once you take out long time 
horizons, perfect foresight, perfect capital markets and the absence of liquidity 
constraints, fiscal pessimism is no longer warranted.3 But given the traditional 
proximity of the Fund to the mainstream, what truly shaped debates at the Fund 
were internal critiques coming from the NCM camp itself.4  
As early as 2001, these critiques began to emerge after prominent NCM 
economists began to find positive and high fiscal multipliers (well above zero, but 
below 1.0),5 thus implying that fiscal policy could have expansionary effects on 
                                                        
2 For an in-depth overview and in-depth critique of expansionary austerity see Blyth (2013).  
3 For an overview of external critiques see Arestis (2012).  
4 Author interview with European Department economist, January 2012. 
5 The fiscal multiplier is the ratio of change that government spending produce in national 
income. A positive multiplier means that fiscal expansions increase growth. As far as mainstream 
economics is concerned, this is an uncontroversial calculative device. 
economic output.6 One of the champions of this revisionist position to NCM was 
Olivier Blanchard, a MIT economics professor and IMF consultant who went on to 
become the chief economist of the Fund after 2008.  
To get more specific, I looked at debates on fiscal policy published during 
between 2008 and 2012 in elite economics journals such as American Economics 
Review and Journal of Economic Literature.  
Already by 2009, revisionists from top academic departments began to calibrate 
DGSE models to approximate the conditions of the crisis (tight microeconomic 
fundamentals, zero lower bound interest rates) and found consistently high 
multipliers. Some of the most pivotal studies of this kind were authored by a 
group of economists from Berkeley (Alan Auerbach, Brad deLong, Yuri 
Gorodnichenko) and Northwestern (Martin Eichenbaum, Larry Christiano, Sergio 
Rebelo). One of the DGSE papers finding a dramatic bang for the government 
spending buck at zero lower bound was Gauti Eggertson, an Icelandic economist 
from the Fed who had done his PhD with Paul Krugman and co-authored with 
leading NCM economist Michael Woodford.7  
Some of the articles argue that fiscal policy activism is needed in the Great 
Recession and deplore lack of attention of macroeconomists to fiscal policy 
design. Berkeley’s Alan Auerbach and Harvard’s Martin Feldstein make the case 
for stimulus from within the parameters of orthodoxy. After they bows to one of 
neoliberalism’s foundational moments (the Lucas critique), they go on to argue 
that in very special circumstances (an environment with liquidity constraints, zero 
interest rates, a recession longer than 12 months and credit market disruptions) 
fiscal policy interventions do have some benefits. With this tight specification in 
mind, Auerbach and Feldstein propose that such interventions should consist of 
tax refunds for corporations, lower corporate income tax, the indefinite 
postponement of higher tax rates on dividends, capital gains and high income 
individuals and even the resuscitation of Reagan era tax schemes meant to 
incentivize corporate investment and household consumption.  
Surprisingly, it is Martin Feldstein, the economist with a more conservative 
reputation of the two who makes the case that increased government spending 
along the lines proposed by the then President elect Barack Obama that should 
do the heavy-lifting through a stimulus designed to be “big, quick and targeted                                                         
6 This means that if the multiplier is higher than one, the economy grows more than the amount 
spent on the fiscal stimulus.  
7 For an overview of this debate see Batini et al 2012. 
at increasing aggregate activity and employment”(Feldstein 2009: 558). Should it 
fail, the response would be first even higher spending, followed by a combination 
between currency devaluation and retrenchment in substantial and permanent 
tax cuts on personal and corporate income. 
 
Prior to the crisis there was a robust consensus that cuts have robust multiplier 
effects but if they are expected to be permanent and are targeted at low- and 
medium income, indebted households have the highest multiplier. During the 
crisis elite economists suggested that same was true of the multiplier effects of 
welfare payments, unemployment insurance and corporate investment incentives 
(review by Auerbach et al 2010: 146-150). 
Moreover, a recalibrated NCM model with financial frictions finds that increases 
in government expenditure can be a more powerful stimulus in the short run than 
tax cuts (Fernandez-Villaverde 2010). Below is a presentation of the affiliation of 
“revisionists” working on fiscal policy. 
 
The revisionist drive continued as the sovereign debt crisis deepened in Europe. 
Using New Keynesian models, fiscal policy “mandarin” Michael Woodford further 
boosted the case for countercyclical government spending, arguing that with 
sticky prices and wages, fiscal multipliers can be larger than one and can lead to 
an increase in welfare (Woodford 2011). Lawrence Christiano and Martin 
Eichenbaum’s supported his findings with an article showing that when nominal 
interest rates are bound at zero, the fiscal multiplier is significantly larger than 
predicted under standard NCM models. To this end, they provided empirical 
evidence for a new pro-stimulus argument: multipliers are large because the rise 
in government spending increases output, marginal cost, and expected inflation. 
Since nominal rates are at zero, a rise in inflation causes a decrease in real 
interest rates, which leads to a rise in private spending. This initiates the process 
of rising output levels again, and the net result becomes a large increase in 
output.  
 
The orthodox resistance 
 
Since the multiplier debate did not consume so much of the energies of the 
profession until 2008, the defenders of the status quo did not mobilize against 
revisionism until the first few months of the crisis. What triggered this was that 
Berkeley professor Christina Romer who was then Obama’s economic advisor co-
authored a study whose “old” Keynesian model suggested multipliers around 1.5 
that justified the need for fiscal policy stimulus in recessions triggered by credit 
crunches (Romer and Bernstein 2009). This was a major turnaround considering 
that the Romer had previously bolstered the orthodox idea that monetary policy 
is useful in recessions while fiscal policy is not (Romer and Romer 1994).  
The orthodox charge against this position was spearheaded by a joint US-
German research team who found very low and negative multipliers (Cogan et al 
2009). Critically, these economists rejected the Romer study for not using the 
NCM model (DGSE) that academic economists, central banks and international 
organizations could find respectable.  
As the crisis deepened, it became clear that even when after the Great Recession 
struck, not all mainstream economists rediscovered Keynes in their foxholes. 
Some argued that the debate over fiscal policy cannot be settled during to the 
indeterminacy of research on multipliers, thus suggesting that policy should err 
on the side of conservatism (Ramey 2011). Others showed that higher debt 
cancels the effects of higher multipliers (Uhlig 2010) while others radicalized fiscal 
neoliberalism arguing that welfare should be turned into tradeable financial 
instruments, thus turning welfare recipients into entrepreneurs (Snower et al 
2009). Others still deepened the neoliberal tax regime by advocating for the 
further lowering taxes at the high end of the income distribution and the non-
taxation of capital income (Mankiw et al 2009) or for the replacement of 
progressive income taxation a flat tax consumption tax (Correia 2010) 
 
In contrast to the revisionists, Stanford’s John Taylor (2009) and 
Columbia’sFrederic Mishkin (2009) resist the argument that discretionary fiscal 
policy is effective when the short-term interest rate reaches the lower bound of 
zero. Modern neo-Keynesian arguments such as those advanced by Summers, 
Krugman or Romer are written off by Taylor with the argument that they don’t 
use mainstream dynamic general stochastic equilibrium modeling (DGSE) and fail 
to include New Classical rational expectations. 
An ECB study found new evidence for a foundational moment of neoliberalism: 
Robert Lucas’ (1973) onslaught against the Keynesian Phillips curve. Others 
attacking the New Keynesian “sticky prices” theory by arguing that prices respond 
quickly to idiosyncratic shocks (like the Lehman Brothers) but only weakly and 
slowly to nominal shocks such as expansionary monetary policies (Mackowiak 
and Wiederholt 2009).  
 
An analysis of the EMU finds that it led to the fiscal profligacy, suggesting that 
tougher and more depoliticized fiscal constraints should be put in place (Beetsma 
and Giuliodori 2009). In a preemptive strike against demands for increasing the 
tax burden at the top of the income distribution, some economists argued that 
the estate tax has little effect on the investment and saving decisions of small 
businesses but by distorting the decisions of larger firms it reduces aggregate 
output and savings (Cagetti and de Nardi 2009) 
Christopher Nekarda and Valerie Ramey took the battle further by investigating 
the effect of growth in government expenditure at the industry level. Their study 
found that the transmission mechanism that renders fiscal policy ineffective is the 
“old” neoclassical reasoning where increased labor hours results in lower real 
wages. This offsetting change causes markups to remain unchanged, and thus 
fiscal policy has failed to increase output. Similarly, Cavel, Cohen, and Malloy 
(2011) attack the conventional Keynesian wisdom that government expenditure 
results in increased income in the economy by using an innovative instrumental 
variable to produce exogenous shocks in state level expenditure. Their article 
finds that the significant increase in federal funds to the home state of members 
of Congress lead to significant reduction in investment, employment, research 
and development, and payout decisions by firms. According to the paper, this 
occurs because of crowding out through the mechanisms of labor market and 
fixed industrial assets.  
Five years into the crisis it is safe to say that the revisionists have an edge in the 
conversation but have not displaced the orthodox. Beyond the multiplier debate, 
however, the revisionists were much less inclined to rock the boat. At the end of 
the day, their work intimated that fiscal expansions should be carried out only if 
there is fiscal space and investor credibility, two variables whose measurements 
have been subject to a great deal of conservative calculations and market panics. 
Indeed, the entire debate has taken place in terms that do not challenge the 
political goal of not “scaring” the markets. Ultimately, the revisionist papers are 
either oblivious to or are casually dismissive of the use of sovereign debt 
restructuring or higher inflation as ways to create fiscal space for stimulating the 
economy. The Keynesian goal of full employment is nowhere to be seen. 
How did academic orthodoxy and/or revisionism reach the Fund and with what 
consequences for its policy advice?  It is to these transmission channels that the 
paper turns to next by focusing on the research cited by the IMF’s official reports 
on fiscal policy doctrine: the World Economic Outlook and the Global Fiscal 
Monitor. 
Staff papers and the Fund’s doctrine 
 
Editing entailed the introduction ideas with Keynesian policy implications into 
select elements of NCM theoretical continuum. The outcome was a new 
perspective on the expansionary virtues of austerity, the utility of the fiscal 
stimulus and the timing and composition of fiscal consolidation. This section will 
analyze these patterns by looking first at staff research authored by individual 
staff and then at general research reports containing the official view of the 
Fund’s Research Department (RED) and Fiscal Affairs department (FAD). 
Against the strong neoclassical thesis that austerity can in fact lead to economic 
expansion, most IMF research suggests that in the specific conditions of the post-
2008 crisis fiscal consolidation is in fact contractionary while fiscal stimulus 
packages are more likely to be expansionary (e.g. Spilimbergo et al 2008; 2009; 
Ball et al 2011; Guajardo et al 2011; Cotarelli and Jarmillo 2012; Batini et al 2012; 
Baum et al 2012; Blanchard and Leigh 2013; Eyraud and Weber 2013). Judging by 
its extensive citation, the defining moment of this shift was the publication on 
December 29, 2008 of a joint staff position note by two departments tasked with 
fiscal policy research: the Research Department (RED) and the Fiscal Affairs 
Department (FAD) (Spilimbergo et al 2008).  
The paper was co-authored by RED and FAD directors and laid down the 
groundwork for macroeconomic policy during recessions: “a timely, large, lasting, 
diversified, and sustainable fiscal stimulus that is coordinated across countries 
with a commitment to do more if the crisis deepens”(p.2). According to that 
paper, crisis economics had two policy priorities: stabilize the banking sector and 
increase aggregate demand through monetary and fiscal expansion. New 
Consensus skepticism about the need for fiscal policy activism in recessions was 
suspended. Moreover, a few of the IMF policy doxa (export-led recovery, activist 
monetary policy) were dismissed in the name of the transnational character of 
recession and the looming zero lower bound in interest rates. Concerns with low 
multipliers were brushed aside: all multipliers were declared uncertain and so 
policy diversification to stimulate aggregate demand was urgent. The orthodox 
objection that spending increases have long lags was declared irrelevant given 
the expected long recession. There were to be tax cuts for the most credit 
constrained, more spending on existing programs (mainly transfers to sub-
national entities), increased provision of unemployment benefits, expansions of 
safety nets where these were limited. The Fund economists demanded support 
for those facing foreclosures, cash transfers to buy cars, government guarantees 
of new credit for firms in chapter 11 type procedures and public works targeted 
at long-term growth potential. Higher taxes on high-income brackets were 
considered a sustainability mechanism. Hoover’s America emerges as the poster 
case for how not to run a crisis.  
 
Yet upon closer inspection the change looked more modest. Most importantly, 
the plea for fiscal expansion was limited to countries that did not face volatile 
capital flows, high public and foreign indebtedness and large risk premia. Second, 
new entitlement programs were criticized for being hard to reverse and already 
creating long-term problems. Third, there remained orthodox skepticism about 
wage increases and sectoral subsidies, as they distort the uneven playing field 
towards MNCs. Finally, to make this stimulus sustainable, the Fund asked for anti-
discretionary institutions: reversible measures with clear sunset clauses or certain 
economic conditions and independent fiscal councils, 
 
This policy line was bolstered in future IMF staff papers. The most forceful case 
for expansion or at least neutral fiscal policy during recessions came from IMF 
staff working with a key methodological problem of the policy area under 
investigation here: fiscal multipliers. The orthodox studies on multipliers use 
models that did not allow them to vary between expansion and recession while 
failing to capture monetary policy. In 2012, the coalition of IMF and Berkeley 
academic economists took the initiative on this front as well. The Berkeley 
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) study and two IMF papers (Betina et al 
2012; Baum et al 2012) addressed these problems and found consistently high 
multipliers and particularly so in recessions. Using an innovative methodology, 
Batini et al (2012) found that smooth and gradual consolidations are to be 
preferred to frontloaded or aggressive consolidations. Against conventional IMF 
studies, they found that this was especially the case for economies in recession 
facing high-risk premia on public debt, because sheltering growth is key to the 
success of fiscal consolidation in these cases. Consistent with the analytical 
framework embraced by this paper, this IMF study stresses layering when they 
argued that the estimates of the multipliers they estimate for both recessions and 
expansions are “broadly consistent with the theoretical arguments in both (old) 
Keynesian and (new) modern business cycle models” (Betina et al 2012: 7). Similar 
points were made by Baum et al (2012), whose study adds that when the output 
gap is negative at the time the fiscal shock is initially implemented, frontloading 
consolidation will have a larger short- term impact on output than a more 
gradual fiscal adjustment. 
Other studies further enlarged the horizons opened by Spilimbergo et al (2008). 
While some find new arguments against frontloading consolidation across 
national policy contexts, others demanded an enhanced role for public 
investments. One endorses expansions and stresses increased capital spending, 
with a bias for public sector investments due to their high multipliers (Muir and 
Weber 2013). It argues that increased capital spending financed by higher 
indirect tax revenue collections through base broadening has sizeable growth 
effects over the medium and long- term. Increasing spending by 2 percent of 
nominal GDP leads, in the long run, to a 30 percentage point increase in the stock 
of public infrastructure. This, in turn increases the productivity of factors of 
production in the economy, so that real GDP increases about 3 percent relative to 
its baseline value. Moreover, they argue that a permanent increase in government 
investment can be more effective than an increase in private investment, as 
government investment is typically on infrastructure such as roads, hospitals, 
public institutions, etc., which depreciate at a slower rate than the stock of 
machinery and equipment. 
 
Cautionary notes about frontloading austerity stress not business expectations, as 
in the standard New Consensus framework, but workers’ expectations. A study 
co-authored by the deputy director of the Research department (Ashoka Mody) 
found that despite the 2009 recovery, uncertainty of households remained and so 
did their steep increase in pro-saving behavior. The key explanation was the 
economy-wide unemployment rate. It was not future taxes, but catastrophic 
income loss via job loss that is positively correlated with the saving rate even 
after controlling for disposable income growth and the interest rate (Mody et al 
2012). Along the same lines, a study authored by two favorite IMF collaborators 
from Bocconi university questioned the New Consensus stress on the 
expectations of the financial sector when they showed that in recessions with 
sticky prices, the brunt of tax increases is more likely to be expansionary if it 
favors constrained borrowers rather than savers (Monacelli and Perotti 2011). 
A research paper co-authored by senior staff at RED demonstrated empirically 
the importance of expansionary credit policy in a recession triggered by a 
banking crisis (Classens et al 2008). Similar points were made for developing 
countries in position papers co-authored by a RED deputy director (Ghosh et al 
2009) and the director of the Western Hemisphere Department (Eyzaguirre et al 
2008).  
In Keynesian fashion, these papers argued that given the collapse in private 
demand, states were supposed to ramp up both public investments and transfers 
to those who were more likely to spend (the unemployed and the poor 
households). Against the orthodox line, they stressed the role of public 
investments and downplayed the expansionary virtues of tax cuts with the 
Keynesian argument that they are more likely to be saved. They also dismissed 
once fashionable items of the IMF policy advice for recessions (export-led 
recovery, exclusive reliance on activist monetary policy) and spurned as irrelevant 
for a prolonged recession the orthodox objection that spending increases have 
long lags. 
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Yet this fiscal policy optimism was heavily qualified by orthodox concerns. Even if 
they agreed with the hypothesis that fiscal policy had high multipliers in the 
conditions of the crisis, virtually all these papers raised the issue of credibility with 
the markets. Indeed, the main goal of policy remained the reassurance of 
financial markets through “long-run debt sustainability.” Revisionist studies 
(Cottarelli and Jaramillo 2012; Baldacci et al 2012) joined orthodox ones (Kumar 
and Woo 2011; Baldacci and Kumar 2010) in highlighting the negative effects on 
growth of debt levels over 60 percent of GDP, a much more demanding 
threshold than the 90 percent threshold proposed by the subsequently 
discredited study of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). Therefore, the stimulus was 
deemed appropriate only for countries with low levels of debt and deficits8 and 
with strong fiscal institutions.9 For the others, as the FAD director recently put it, 
“some adjustment is needed, but at a steady even pace, without frontloading, 
except in countries facing pressures from markets (and even in this case, there 
would be a speed limit to fiscal adjustment)”(Cotarelli 2013). As a former deputy 
chief economist of the Fund recently noted, the Fund’s main mission has been 
and continues to be reassurance of sovereign bond markets.10  
Even where the IMF papers endorse stimulus, they demand neoliberal 
institutional reforms: the constitutionalization of fiscal policy-making (budget 
ceilings, fiscal councils, more power to central banks and finance ministries), 
long-term retrenchment and especially cuts in the future growth of “entitlement” 
programs like healthcare and pensions.11 In the same vein, they stress the 
constraints of institutional depth in estimating the size of the fiscal space in 
developing countries, whose poorer tax collection capacity and volatile sovereign 
bond market conditions could only afford smaller (if any) stimulus opportunities.  
Perhaps the most dramatic departure from the mainstream is represented by 
evidence for the (neo-)Keynesian argument advocated for some time by Paul 
Krugman, Brad deLong and other “unreformed” Keynesians that fiscal 
consolidation can be self-defeating in countries that had problems with                                                         
8 IMF research shows that debt levels significantly reduce growth when they exceed the 90 
percent threshold (Kumar and Woo, 2011, and Baum, Checherita and Rother, 2012). Other studies, 
endorsed by Fiscal Affairs (Cotarelli and Vinals 2009), operated with a more demanding 60 
percent threshold (Horton, Kumar, and Mauro, 2009). 
9 A subsequent IMF study found that Australia, New Zealand, Korea, Sweden and Denmark fit 
these conditions with a high degree of confidence (Ostry al 2010).  
10 Speech by Michael Dooley, Boston University, April 6, 2013.  
11 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2009/09/blanchardindex.htm; 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2009/03/cottarelli.htm  
 
credibility. After 2011, several teams of IMF researchers-including some led by 
the RED and FAD directors-argued that the resulting fall in output can trigger a 
raise in public debt, and lead to potentially higher risk premia in sovereign debt 
markets (Cotarelli 2011; Cotarelli and Jaramillo 2012; Batini et al 2012; Baum et al 
2012; Eyraud and Weber 2013; Blanchard and Leigh 2013). Moreover, one recent 
study went as far as demonstrating that the most consistent fiscal consolidators 
end up being punished by the markets because their efforts to get the debt ratio 
to converge to the official target leads to repeated rounds of tightening that in 
turn worsen the outcome even more (Eyraud and Weber 2013).12 Nevertheless, as 
the next section shows, these charges against the Fund’s neoclassical orthodoxy 
have not travelled into the RED and FAD reports. 
 
Another intriguing pattern is that research moved the debate on the content of 
fiscal consolidations in a direction that is more sensitive to issues of distribution. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom about the IMF’s indifference to economic 
inequalities, poverty and unemployment, distributional concerns articulated with 
unorthodox ideas began to loom large in IMF staff research (Spilimbergo et al 
2008; Cotarelli and Vinals 2009; Cotarelli 2009; Baldacci et al 2011; 2012; Berg and 
Ostry 2011; Bastagli et al 2012; Gupta et al 2012). These papers advised tax cuts 
for the most credit constrained, increased spending on automatic stabilizers and 
an expansion of the scope of the safety nets where these were too narrow.  
There was support for public works likely to reduce unemployment and boost 
growth potential. A more progressive tax burden that included higher wealth 
taxes, externality correcting taxes (carbon tax) and financial sector taxes emerged 
as appropriate mechanisms to rekindle growth. Moreover, a paper co-authored 
by a deputy director at RED argued that what is missing from models that 
estimate future expectations is the specter of catastrophic income loss triggered 
by unemployment (Mody et al 2012). Such pleas were part of IMF’s concerns 
about the negative effects of austerity on productivity, competitiveness, debt 
sustainability and financial stability, but one study also found a causal connection 
between high inequality and high debt (Kumhof et al 2010).  
Finally, there has been a great deal of editing in the Fund’s view of the 
composition of fiscal policy. To the IMF’s canned sermon on the importance of 
labor market deregulation, staff research added the imperative of blending 
centralized wage setting mechanisms with firm-level industrial relations                                                         
12 Recent statements against austerity by the biggest buyer of sovereign bonds (PIMCO) suggest 
that they continued to inhabit a world that chief economist Olivier Blanchard saw as positively 
“schizophrenic.”http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2011/12/21/2011-in-review-four-hard-truths/ 
(Blanchard et al 2013). Critically, tax rises were preferred to expenditure cuts due 
to the fact the latter improve both private sector expectations and 
competitiveness (Spilimbergo et al 2008; Guajardo et al 2012; Corsetti et al 2012; 
Baldacci et al 2010; Kand 2010; Cotarelli and Jaramillio 2012). Several studies 
suggested that increases in public investments (capital outlays) and cuts in the 
VAT are critical for growth while income tax cuts are not  (Arslanalp et al 2011; 
Muir and Weber 2011; Baldacci et al 2012). Some papers go as far as arguing that 
government investments should be prioritized because they create public goods 
that depreciate at a slower rate than the private sector’s stock (Baldacci et al 
2012; Muir and Weber 2013).  
As for the defense of the old status quo, the studies upholding the expansionary 
austerity line on fiscal policy rely on country studies done by regional desks 
(Purfield and Rosenberg 2011; Beschevant et al 2011; Berkmen 2011) and that 
few choose direct confrontation with the revisionist studies presented above. For 
example, one study that found much less fiscal space in the countries regarded 
by fiscal policy optimists as eligible for fiscal expansion and suggested they 
should frontload consolidation as well (Veleculescu 2010). Another study shows 
that under some conditions, lenders have neoclassical rather than Keynesian 
expectations about the future and therefore can help trigger the expansion of 
corporate credit (Agca and Igan 2013). Other studies strengthened the orthodox 
line when they showed that households move from non-Ricardian to Ricardian 
behavior at government debt levels that exceeds 60 percent of GDP (Kumar and 
Woo 2010; Battacharya and Mukherjee 2010).   
To assess the extent to which this IMF research travelled into its policy 
recommendations, the analysis now turns to the content of the general reports 
put forth by RED (World Economic Outlook) and FAD (Global Fiscal Monitor). 
Unlike the staff papers, these reports represent the official views of these 
departments. They are important for another reason: they function as “ epistemic 
courts” (Toloumin 1969) that adjudicate and enforce what constitutes consensus 
about the Fund’s economists shared problems, methods and ideas about how the 
economy works.  
Doctrinal changes 
 
While they generally integrated the research findings reviewed above, some of 
the more transformative policy ideas from staff research have not shaped the 
policy line of the reports.  
Certainly, some of the more extreme views on austerity were rejected. Citing staff 
papers, the reports rejected both the expansionary austerity thesis as well as the 
frontloading of austerity everywhere for the sake of credibility. In contrast, the 
researchers’ hostility towards unorthodox debt reduction is emphasized 
throughout. 
On other aspects of the fiscal policy debate, the integration of innovative IMF 
research is more uneven. The defense of inequality and unemployment-reducing 
social services, progressive tax reforms and job programs has become part and 
parcel of the reports and co-habits with the Fund’s old neoliberal answer to 
unemployment (labor market deregulation, lower corporate taxes, tightening 
eligibility for social benefits, including disability pensions; reducing the duration 
and level of social benefits when “too high” etc.). But the arguments made in 
some IMF studies that progressive tax increases are less contractionary that 
expenditure cuts has not. 
An even more complex pattern emerged with regard to the content of the 
credibility thesis. Stimulus remains an option not only for the handful of 
“advanced” countries that faced contractions with stronger fiscal positions and 
lower public debt, but also for low and middle income states that met these 
conditions.  
But reassuring the bond markets via debt reduction remains the main goal and 
there is only a very limited incorporation of staff research highlighting the self-
defeating nature of fiscal consolidation with regard to debt reduction. While the 
IMF endorsed an expansion of the social safety net in low and middle-income 
states where it was too thin, it demanded its extensive retrenchment in high-
income states where embedded liberalism had left behind generous social 
services.  
The extent to which orthodoxy was thus edited varied over time. There was a 
great deal of fiscal policy optimism in 2008 and 2009, when reports suggest that 
where fiscal space, credible institutions and credibility were available, stimulus 
measures should continue as long as exit strategies are announced for the 
medium term. By 2010 the tone changes slightly in favor of an earlier, sharper 
and institutionally bound exit from stimulus. Yet contra the enthusiasm for 
“growth-friendly fiscal consolidation “ prevailing in the G-20 meeting of the same 
year, the reports caution against an “abrupt withdrawal” (a cut in the deficit 
greater than 1 percent a year). The 2010 WEO sounded Keynesian when it argued 
that when the rest of the world is tightening at the same time, the output cost of 
a 1 percent of GDP fiscal consolidation can double to 2 percent for a small open 
economy where the interest rate is at the zero lower bound. The door to stimulus 
remained open when the report noted that if growth threatened to slow 
appreciably more than expected, advanced economies with fiscal room, good 
fiscal institutions and safe haven status should let the fiscal stabilizers operate 
and slow the pace of adjustment.  
In 2011 the reports took a more conservative stance, praising Europe’s strong 
frontloading of austerity and making optimistic projections of its effects on 
credibility. Moreover, based on a FAD study showing that bond yields in 
emerging markets are very sensitive to global risk aversion, they counseled low 
and middle-income economies to rebuild fiscal buffers and cut spending despite 
the fact that they were facing less market pressure than developed countries. 
Nevertheless, the report contains an unambiguous denunciation of the 
expansionary austerity thesis. 
Subsequent reports qualify this retrenchment. The 2012 Monitor stresses that ‘in 
the current recessionary context, the negative impact of fiscal adjustment on 
activity can be expected to be large, as confirmed by new work on the size of 
fiscal multipliers during periods of weak economic activity’ (p. ix). This idea is 
taken to its logical conclusion in the October 2012 WEO, which incorporates IMF 
research from 2011-2012 showing that multipliers were much higher than the 
Fund had thought. The 2012 Monitor also finds the 2008-2009 output shock was 
in fact greater than anything in IMF datasets and therefore that growth would 
arrive later than expected. Nevertheless, despite such acknowledgements of 
revisionist research, debt reduction remained the main policy goal and therefore 
deficit reduction remained the main policy instrument.  
By 2012, following the acceptance of revisionist research on multipliers, both RED 
and FAD reports demanded a slower adjustment in the countries with low 
credibility and stressed the importance of expansion in the countries with 
credibility. The reports of both departments now have a more poignant critique 
of the excessively harsh budget cuts in the US and Europe based on the 
argument that such excessive austerity is likely to worsen the downturn and 
investors’ expectations through government’s focus on nominal rather than 
structural deficit targets.  
Suggestively, the October 2012 WEO report reflected the fact that staff that had 
made the case for higher multipliers in recessions were winning the internal 
debate. At the beginning of the crisis, an IMF study (Spilimbergo et al 2009) 
found that government consumption multipliers are 0.5 or less in small open 
economies, with smaller values for revenue and transfers and slightly larger ones 
for investment. But as the crisis advanced, other staff put forth papers suggesting 
that multipliers are significantly larger in recessions (Batini et al 2012, Baum et al 
2012). In practice, the IMF used forecasting models using average multipliers of 
0.5 to measure the impacts of fiscal consolidation on growth prospects. In 
contrast, the October 2012 WEO found that in fact they ranged between .9 to 1.7 
(the Eurozone periphery is closer to the higher end of the range), an error that 
explained the IMF’s extremely optimistic growth projections for countries who 
frontloaded fiscal consolidation.  Assuming the multiplier was 1.5, a fiscal 
adjustment of 3 percent of GDP-as much as Spain has to do next year- would 
lead to a GDP contraction of 4.5 percent. It was momentous finding and those 
who had been skeptical of the virtues of austerity felt vindicated.13 
Olivier Blanchard’s role was critical in this regard. His research used higher values 
for multipliers as early as 2001 and his appointment as the Fund’s chief 
economist in September 2008 relaxed the traditional fiscal policy skepticism of 
the institution. This relaxation was also facilitated by the appointment of Carlo 
Cotarelli, a skeptic of expansionary austerity as head of the influential Fiscal 
Affairs Department of the IMF. From this position, he was responsible for the 
development and publication of the Fiscal Monitor, one of the three IMF flagship 
publications. With these new appointments, New Keynesian fiscal policy 
optimism had a better chance to prevail in the Fund. 
 
As early as December 2008, Blanchard co-authored a paper that made the 
frontloading of fiscal stimulus measures a centerpiece of crisis economics, at least 
for certain countries. This entailed tweaking balanced budget rules to prevent 
cuts in existing programs, increasing the state’s share in public-private 
partnerships, increases in public sector employment, more transfers for those at 
the bottom end of the income distribution (the minimum wage workers, the 
unemployed, the foreclosed). Where the social safety net was narrow, the state 
had to step in to expand it. While it cautioned against industrial policies targeted 
at domestic firms, the paper urged governments to offer guarantees on new 
credit for firms whose fate was threatened by the credit crunch. This was hardly 
the bad cop material associated with the IMF medicine in the past decades. 
 
But there was an important caveat to all this: fiscal activism was legit only as long 
as financial markets deemed it sustainable. At the time, it seemed that the entire 
Eurozone still benefited from “safe haven” status for bond investors so the IMF                                                         
13 http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/13/times-like-this-are-different/ 
http://notthetreasuryview.blogspot.co.uk/2012/10/more-on-multipliers-why-does-it-
matter.html  
http://mainlymacro.blogspot.co.uk/2012/10/multipliers-using-theory-and-evidence.html 
agreed to fiscal expansions there. But countries that faced pressures in the bond 
markets (Hungary, Latvia and Romania in 2008-2009) had to engage in fiscal 
consolidation in order to rebuild confidence. The same applied to Southern 
Europe and Ireland after 2010. As a result, the Fund was in agreement with the 
European policy line on the “periphery” –including by marshaling models with 
low multipliers-but disagreed with them on the need for austerity in the 
eurozone’s “core. The last WEO changes a lot of things, but not the IMF’s 
prescription of austerity where it hurts the most.  
At any rate, at least at the doctrinal levelMost importantly, there wasis a 
resolute turn against frontloaded austerity in the 2012 WEO. There are 
warnings about the risk of deflation (Decressin and Laxton 2009) but what is 
particularly striking is that two new lines of attack appear. The most important 
is the finding that since 2008 the economic slack was so large, the interest 
rates so low, and fiscal adjustment so synchronized that fiscal multipliers were 
constantly well over 1. This finding implies that the IMF underestimated the 
negative effects of austerity output because it assumed values of the fiscal 
multiplier that were too low (Batini et al 2012). This concern is echoed in IMF 
studies cited in the year’s GFM (Baum, Poplawski-Ribeiro, and Webel 2012). 
Second, even as another cited study encouraged spending cuts in health, 
pensions and public employment in wealthy countries like Italy, its findings 
also stressed that fiscal consolidation had been ultimately self-defeating in the 
past because it increased public debt levels (Ball et al 2011). The same finding 
is echoed in studies cited in GFM that argue that fiscal consolidation when the 
multiplier is high erodes some of the gains in market credibility as a result of a 
higher debt ratio and lower short-term growth, which causes an increase 
borrowing costs (Cotarelli et al 2011; 2012).  
 
IMF research cited in the 2013 reports makes similar points but breaks 
precedent by emphasizing raising more revenue via increased taxation of the 
wealthy. In WEO, deflation warnings from a 2002 paper are sounded yet again 
(Decressin and Laxton 2009) and the need for stimulus in countries that enjoy 
fiscal space is reaffirmed (Blanchard and Leigh 2013; Spilimbergo et al 2008; 
Kang et al 2013; Ostry and Ghosh 2013). These ideas share space in the report 
with warnings about the growth-depleting effects of high debt (Kumar and 
Woo 2010). The GFM struggles to achieve a similar balance. It cites studies that 
establish the ineffectiveness of default (Das, Papaioannou, Gregorian and 
Maziad 2012; Borensztein and Panizza 2009) and inflation (Akitoby, 
Komatsuzaki, and Blinder 2013) as debt reduction strategies while stressing 
the importance of reducing debt.  
 
At the same time, the GFM cites studies that seem to represent the emergence 
of a new taxation philosophy at the Fund. They continue to endorse a few old 
recipes (the reduction of income taxes while increasing consumption, the 
scrapping of loopholes in personal and corporate income tax, the elimination 
of differential VAT rates, resistance to high marginal income tax, reduced 
employers’ social contributions) yet also advocate greater reliance on taxes 
targeted at the wealthy: property taxes targeted at the top 1 percent (a 
measure estimated to raise between 2-3 percent of the global GDP in new tax 
revenue), financial transactions tax, and a coordinated taxation of offshore 
incomes (Torres 2013; Acosta and Yoo 2012; Norregaard 2013).  
 
Skeptics of fiscal consolidation also tend to be more concerned with the 
distribution of the costs of fiscal consolidation. However, they frame measures 
against inequality not as a normative imperative but as consistent with the IMF’s 
concerns with the political sustainability of consolidation and with low 
productivity challenges (Berg and Ostry 2012). Indeed, contrary to the Fund’s 
previous agnosticism to inequality, a discussion paper authored by a research 
team involving no less than the Fund’s deputy director Sanjeev Gupta sees fiscal 
consolidation as an opportunity to reverse the shrinking of social benefits and the 
progressiveness of income taxes.  They suggested that equality-friendly fiscal 
consolidation should include reducing opportunities for tax evasion and 
avoidance, increasing the progressivity of income taxes over higher income 
brackets, cutting unproductive expenditures, and expanding means-tested 
programs. To make this argument they suggested that enhancing the distributive 
impact of fiscal policy in developing economies will require improving their 
capacity to raise tax revenues and to spend those resources more efficiently and 
equitably. Resource mobilization should focus on broadening income and 
consumption tax bases and expanding corporate and personal income taxes by 
reducing tax exemptions and improving compliance. Expenditure reforms should 
focus on reducing universal price subsidies, improving the capacity to implement 
better-targeted transfers, and gradually expanding social insurance systems 
(Bastagli et al 2012; Berg and Ostry 2012). 
If one looks outside the range of cited IMF papers.one generally finds a similar 
range of views, although the orthodox voices are more widely represented. One 
study found much less fiscal space in the countries regarded as eligible for 
expansion and suggested they should frontload consolidation as well 
(Veleculescu 2010). Working with firm-level data, a joint GWU-IMF study showed 
that under come conditions (stable government, lax monetary policy, 
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devaluations), if fiscal consolidations are large and focused on VAT and 
entitlement cuts, lenders have neoclassical rather than Keynesian expectations 
about the future and therefore can help trigger expansion of corporate credit 
(Agca and Igan 2013). Other studies showed that households move from non-
Ricardian to Ricardian behavior at government debt that exceeds 60 percent of 
GDP (Battacharya and Mukherjee 2010). Others praise Latvia’s orthodox austerity 
program and even contend that not using devaluation was appropriate (Purfield 
and Rosenberg 2011) while a case study of several African countries and Japan 
respectively stresses both the growth-inducing and credibility-enhancing effects 
of fiscal consolidation (Beschevant et al 2011; Berkmen 2011).  
From doctrine to practice 
 
Empirical studies show that the way in which the IMF communicated its doctrine 
to governments via article IV consultations has been broadly in line with the 
skepticism of IMF researchers about expansionary austerity or the frontloading of 
fiscal consolidation in all countries. Surprisingly, these studies avoid the 
developed capitalist core, a gap that this paper attempts to address.14 
With regard to low-income countries (LICs), Wayenberge et al (2011) have found 
more flexibility in the Fund’s approach: in 13 of them, the IMF played the 
orthodox card but in 6 of them more expansionary policies were employed. At 
the same time, the Fund remained passive on boosting LIC potential for 
mobilizing additional domestic revenue, or for creating greater fiscal space with 
additional debt relief initiatives or further grant assistance. And even where 
expansion was allowed, the focus was on current expenditures rather than on 
capital investment, a chronic source of weakness for low-income countries’ long-
term development prospects. Yet additional studies conducted by the ILO 
(Ramos and Roy 2011; Islam et al 2012) found a clearer pro-frontloading bias 
when the sample was expanded to include middle-income countries. For 
example, in 48 out of 50 cases analyzed by Islam et al (2012), the Fund’s standard 
recommendation was fiscal discipline irrespective of the cycle. Nevertheless, the 
Fund showed skepticism towards the New Classical arguments that consolidation 
is best done via spending cuts. The Islam et al (2012) study found that the IMF 
had a clear preference for additional revenue mobilization (42 out of 50 
countries), with expenditure restraint being advised only in 24 countries. These 
findings confirm the mainstream view among IMF researchers that the confidence 
effects of fiscal consolidation in low and middle-income countries should take                                                         14 The exception is the Weisbrot and Jorgensen (2013) study of article IV reports in the EU, but its content analysis is flawed as it does not distinguish between frontloaded and backloaded fiscal consolidation.   
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precedence over concerns with their short-term contractionary effects on output. 
The findings of some IMF research showing that frontloaded fiscal consolidation 
is bad for confidence have yet to travel in IMF advice to the global periphery.  
These studies only code the early crisis years and do not look across the Global 
North-Global South frontier. To address this gap, this study did a content analysis 
of article IV consultations conducted with low, middle and high-income states 
between October 2011 and October 2011. This analysis is then supplemented 
with a close reading of all article IV reports published since the October 2012 
WEO in order to identify potential echoes of the high-level endorsement of high 
multipliers at the IMF’s “grassroots” level.  The content analysis reviewed 20 IMF 
article IV consultations and the coding unit was the policy recommendation. This 
was understood to be any recommendation that either (a) confirmed a policy 
adopted or planned to be adopted by the government under review or (b) went 
beyond policies being implemented or that are planned to be implemented.  
All coded reports do not give any indication in the growth effects of fiscal 
consolidation.  On the contrary, they see this policy as a contractionary policy 
option, but one that is imposed on some countries by concerns with debt 
sustainability. For low-income countries fiscal measures the analysis revealed a 
preference for neutral fiscal policy (in three out of five). In addition to standard 
IMF policy measures, these fiscal packages reflected the Fund’s new enthusiasm 
for increased social security and infrastructure spending (Angola, Bolivia, 
Guatemala, Nepal). Of particular interest was the Fund’s praise for Bolvia’s 
poverty and inequality-reducing programs.  
 
In contrast, a preference for consolidation is clear in the case of the middle-
income sample of countries. However, in line with the mainstream tone of the 
IMF research: backloaded consolidation where bond market and deficit 
constraints were weak (Brazil, South Africa) and frontloaded where they were 
strong (Hungary, Lebanon) or where the state collected too little, close to ten 
percent of GDP (Pakistan). The menu of fiscal measures from outside of the usual 
menu but reflecting of IMF research findings included higher public capital 
investment (Brazil, South Africa), more investment in public infrastructure 
(Pakistan), more progressive tax system (Hungary), higher social spending 
(Lebanon, Pakistan), the introduction of universal health coverage (South Africa) 
and higher taxes on capital gains and property (Lebanon, Pakistan). 
 
Article IV reports on high-income countries are also in line with IMF staff 
research: expansions for fiscally virtuous countries facing recessionary dynamics 
(Sweden, Germany), frontloaded fiscal consolidation where deficits and bond 
market vulnerability is high (Ireland, Spain). Interestingly, a slower and more 
gradual fiscal consolidation (although no backloading) is suggested both where 
the government  (a) has still high deficits but faces no sovereign bond market 
problems (Britain) and where the deficit is high but the contraction is so big that 
it risks undermining credibility with bond markets (Spain). In terms of specific 
measures, one finds consistent advise for reducing reliance on expenditure cuts 
and increasing revenue measures (Ireland, Spain), higher property taxes on the 
wealthy (Britain, Ireland), strengthening the safety net for the most vulnerable 
(Ireland, Spain).  
 
How much has the WEO 2012 report changed article IV reports? My analysis 
suggests that three patterns of fiscal crisis economics have emerged: putting 
austerity on hold for the fiscally virtuous, further expenditure cuts and tax 
increases in the countries with fiscal imbalances, higher and more progressive 
taxes in countries that used fiscal consolidation to orchestrate libertarian attacks 
against the state. The dominant pattern has been the reassertion of orthodoxy. In 
Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Portugal, Lithuania and Estonia the Fund praised the 
frontloading of consolidation and urged its continuation irrespective of the cycle 
to this policy option in conjunction with privatizations and structural reforms 
whenever its staff noted flagging commitment going forward. Advice for 
privatizations centered around the use of privatization revenues for cutting debt 
and/or building buffers for future shocks. Throughout the Fund stresses poor tax 
collection capacity, yet not all revenue-maximizing measures are applauded. 
Indeed, the Fund makes some clear choices on this front that reflect the 
endurance of supply-side economics and conservative social policy. Revenue-
boosting measures not certified by the IMF that forced largely multinationals to 
share the burden of adjustment (the Hungarian sectoral taxes on banks, 
privatized energy companies and retailers) are criticized by the Fund as 
distortionary. Similarly, the Fund remains cold on higher taxes in high-income 
states. Thus, the Portugal report stresses that Portugal’s level of taxation is high 
enough and that consequently further cuts in social transfers and public sector 
wages are advisable instead. 
Second, the October 2012 WEO did produce some limited effects. In two cases 
the Fund was more at ease with suggesting/endorsing the backloading of fiscal 
consolidation as a countercyclical policy. Puzzlingly, this was the case not only in 
the IMF advice to a country that has traditionally enjoyed safe haven credibility 
and a reputation for fiscal rigor (the Netherlands). The IMF also applauded short-
term expansionary policy in a middle-income country whose economy imploded 
in 2008 (Estonia) and in low-income economy whose state nearly collapsed a 
decade ago (Albania)(Kajisiu 2010; 2013). What the first two have in common are 
sustainable debt levels and an impeccable record with budgetary discipline 
during the crisis. Moreover, in the eyes of the IMF Estonia validated its theory that 
recoveries can be obtained through internal devaluation. Once budgetary 
discipline was achieved, the Fund endorsed projected increases in public capital 
spending. social spending, unemployment benefits, means-tested child 
allowances, the wage bill (following a 3-year wage bill freeze) and an increase in 
public investment associated with EU structural funds. This was a qualified 
endorsement. First, in Estonia such measures were accepted only so long as they 
were offset by reductions in current spending and were, as a result, budget 
neutral. Second, to forestall future deviations from orthodoxy, the Fund’s blessing 
of expansionary measures came together with praising the adoption of multi-
year expenditure ceilings (already applied in Holland) and suggesting it them 
where they were not in the books (Estonia).  
The third pattern is the Fund thinks that fiscal consolidation measures have been 
too anti-state and anti-poor in some countries. This is clearly the case in 
Lithuania, where the IMF critiques a revenue-to-GDP ratio that is the lowest in the 
EU, capital taxation levels well below the EU average and where excessive reliance 
on (regressive) indirect taxes is matched by very low taxation of wealth, notably 
real estate and motor vehicles. Similar remarks have been made in the case of 
Romania. Consequently, the Fund advises a bigger and more progressive 
government in terms of taxation for this exemplar of libertarian political economy 
(Greskovits and Bohle 2012; Blyth 2013). The report on Lithuania also provides an 
insight on what the IMF has to say about high unemployment when the country 
under review has already deregulated the labor market. In such cases the IMF’s 
last bullets are education reforms aimed at reducing skill mismatches and 
boosting capital formation by reducing administrative burdens and streamlining 
territorial planning procedures would help raise investment.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper makes two related claims. First, the crash of 2008 has not led to a 
Berlin Wall moment for neoliberalism. Although there has been greater 
acceptance of fiscal stimulus and gradual, rather than frontloaded austerity--
where the Fund deemed that the stimulus was unaffordable—overall the 
emphasis on states’ credibility with the financial markets has remained the 
primary goal of the Fund’s fiscal policy paradigm. In this way, the expansion of 
the policy space has taken place in parallel with the further entrenchment of the 
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market-disciplinary modes of governance associated with neoliberalism. As such, 
the Fund’s revisions of its traditional fiscal policy thinking may be seen as part of 
an effort to reprogram the instruments and settings of neoliberalism for the 
political and economic characteristics of the Great Recession.  
Second, the explanation of this cannot be complete without examining the way in 
which IMF staff interpreted the fiscal policy dilemmas brought by a depression in 
developed economies that was triggered by the financial sector. The paper shows 
that given the tight epistemic interconnectedness between IMF researchers and 
mainstream academic economics, the long-run debate in mainstream economics 
over the value of fiscal multipliers was eventually internalized in the Fund, carving 
space for “revisionist” ideas that eventually filtered into the IMF’s official doctrine. 
At a more general level, this paper suggests that the observed hybridity, co-
existence with incongruous intellectual formations, incompleteness and even 
temporary breakdowns should not be equated with imminent paradigmatic 
changes. It also intimates that one should not dismiss the possibility that the 
adaptive incremental transformation noted in fiscal policy will morph into a 
transformative one or, more ambitiously, into a paradigm shift. Alternatively, 
some of the evidence presented here can be read in a more skeptical register. 
The Fund’ fiscal revisionism could be construed as an opportunistic, experimental 
and perhaps reversible intellectual contradiction. Far from being the symptom of 
a metastatic development, a skeptical eye might see this policy hybrid as a 
necessary instrument in any job of tinkering with paradigms in order ensure their 
survival in a challenging environment. 
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